Naga Peace Accord: Does It Allay Pressing Concerns?
August 8, 2015
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Published in elections.in (http://www.elections.in/blog/naga-peace-accord/)
There seems more than what meets the
eyes in the ‘historic’ Naga peace accord signed between the Centre and the
National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) in New Delhi on 3 August.
Firstly, let’s focus on the
political fallout. Except Nagaland (which is ruled by the Nagaland People’s
Front, a constituent of the ruling National Democratic Front in Centre), the
three other states (Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh) directly affected by
the Naga insurgency are all ruled by the Congress party.
Therefore, it’s not surprising that
the Congress President Sonia Gandhi launched a scathing attack on the
government over the accord for not consulting the three chief ministers before
signing the pact.
Yet, what has surprised many is that
at least the chief ministers of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh had publicly
welcomed the accord. Despite raising concerns that the accord “might affect the
interests of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh”, Assam Chief Minister Tarun
Gogoi had acknowledged that the agreement “will help in restoring peace and
prosperity in Nagaland”. In Manipur, too, the chief minister Okram Ibobi Singh
had initially remarked that the prospects of rejecting the accord arose only if
“it disturbs the territorial integrity of Manipur.”
A tragicomical situation arose when
Arunachal CM Nabam Tuki deleted his tweet wherein he had “welcomed” the
initiative that he felt could “bring a peaceful solution to the prolonged Naga
political issue”, after Sonia’s confrontationist approach on the issue with the
Centre.
Didn’t the episode show that even
though these chief ministers longed for peace, they were not willing to rise
above party politics to sincerely address the decades-old Naga problem that
inflicts their respective states? But then, how could they defy their own party
president?
Congress
Accuses NDA of Ignoring Participatory Politics
Apparently, Sonia’s opposition to
the accord was based on the process than the product itself. At a time when the
content of the deal with the NSCN (I-M) is still not out in public, the
Congress president’s objection to the accord on grounds that her CMs were not
consulted on the issue and that it showed Centre’s disregard for the country’s
federal structure, is more political in substance. This is despite the
government’s repeated assurance that the peace process will not bypass the
concerns of these states!
Yet, Sonia’s allegation that the
Centre’s failure to involve her chief ministers in the process showed its
“arrogance” does merit a consideration.
As it is said all too often,
arrogance accompanies strength! Sonia’s criticism is relevant to this extent.
But then, hasn’t the table turned on her now?
When in Opposition, consider how
often the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) accused the Congress-Led United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) of denying “adequate space” to the Opposition! It
may be recalled that on 27 August 2004, the then BJP general secretary and
spokesperson (present finance minister) Arun Jaitley, while objecting to a
reported statement of the then Defence Minister (present President) Pranab
Mukherjee on the “confrontation” between the NDA leaders and the then Prime
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, had accused Mukherjee of behaving “arrogantly” as
if “the Government did not need an opposition”.
Grimly, today’s ‘tit-for-tat’ politics
has surfeit of arrogance and no one is above the board. Hence, the debate on
the issue should end here.
As for the peace accord, it may be
mentioned that the same chief ministers – Singh, Gogoi and Tuki – were at the
helm in 2012 when the then UPA government had held discussions with the NSCN-IM
leaders for a permanent solution to the problem without much success. It is
significant that even at that time, the Centre, despite being ruled by the
Congress-led coalition, had not directly involved these chief ministers in the
negotiations with the insurgent group. So much so that after the peace talks
when the then union home minister Sushil Kumar Shinde sought his assistance to
put an end to the Naga separatist movement, the Manipur CM Singh refused on grounds
that he was not in a position to oblige since his state government was “unaware
of the exact points of agreement” between the NSCN-IM and the Centre!
Emergence
of Naga Insurgency
There
is much more to the latest peace accord. Can this be a lasting solution to the
over six-decades-old insurgency? Before we dwell more on this, it may be
mentioned that the Naga problem has a long history, which traces its origin to
the ethnic Naga movement with the formation of the Naga Club by 20 Nagas in
1918. It was in 1929 that the club had submitted a memorandum to the Simon
Commission to “leave us alone to determine for ourselves as in ancient times”.
In 1946, the club was replaced by
the Naga National Council (NNC) under the leadership of A.Z. Phizo.
In June 1947, the then Assam
Governor Sir Akbar Hyderi signed a nine-point agreement with moderates T
Sakhrie and Aliba Imti of the NNC, in which the Nagas’ right to freely develop
themselves was respected. However, this agreement was outrightly rejected by
Phizo who took objection to the Clause 9 of the agreement that stated
“The Governor of Assam as the Agent of the Government of the Indian Union
will have a special responsibility for a period of 10 years to ensure the
observance of the agreement…”
Phizo declared Naga independence on
14 August 1947 and the NNC went on to conduct a “referendum” in 1951, in which
“99 per cent” supported an “independent” Nagaland. He, thereafter, formed the
underground Naga Federal Government (NFG) and the Naga Federal Army (NFA) on 22
March 1952. The NNC took to arms in 1955.
As a mechanism for conflict
resolution in 1963 the new state of Nagaland was formed but it failed to check
insurgency, as most Naga inhabited areas were left outside the purview of the
new state. What followed was a spree of failed peace pacts:
In 1964, a Nagaland Peace Mission
was created and a ceasefire agreement was signed that lasted till 1968.
In 1975, the Shillong Pact with one
faction of NNC where the NNC members agreed to give up violence and accept the
Indian Constitution was rejected by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah who
left the NNC and finally formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland
(NSCN) in 1980.
It was only in 1997 that insurgency
was contained when the NSCN-IM, then the most lethal insurgent group that had
been pressing for the creation of a Greater Nagaland or ‘Nagalim’ comprising
Naga-dominated areas across Nagaland, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam and
Myanmar, agreed to a ceasefire and inked an accord with the then United Front
government at the Centre.
Ever since, the NSCN-IM always held
to the ceasefire it still does.
Present
Concerns
The concern, at present, is that of
the rival NSCN (Khaplang), which abrogated its ceasefire on 27 March 2015. (The
S.S. Khaplang was a member of the unified NSCN. He broke away from the parent
outfit in 1988 to form NSCN-K). In June 2015, it had attacked and killed 18
Indian Army jawans in Manipur. Besides, yet another faction, the NSCN
–Unification (formed in 2010 after a split in NSCN-K) has opposed the pact on
grounds that “all stakeholders should have been consulted before the signing”
of the pact.
NSCN-IM is undoubtedly the most
influential insurgent group in the region with a budget of over Rs. 100 crore.
In July 2013, it had the gumption to even rebuff the Centre publicly by
asserting that it had the “legitimate right to levy tax in Nagalim” or
Naga-inhabited areas.
The signing of the 2015 pact with
NSCN-IM is widely seen as the culmination of over 80 rounds of negotiations
with the Naga insurgent group.
But the question is why couldn’t the
government bring the other insurgent groups to the table?
This is rather surprising
considering that Ravindra Narayan Ravi, the ex-Special Director of the
Intelligence Bureau who was appointed the government interlocutor in August
2014 with a clear mandate to bring the Nagas around with honour and dignity,
had publicly criticised his predecessors for talking only with the NSCN-IM and
ignoring other insurgent groups and the government of Nagaland in the past. In
a signed article on 29 July 2013, Ravi had gone to the extent of calling former
union home secretary and effectively the first interlocutor K Padmanabhaiah, “a
successful marketing agent for the NSCN-IM…”
Ravi had then not even spared
Padmanabhaiah’s successor, R S Pandey, who he had claimed was “carrying on the
legacy for the last four years”.
Ravi, in the article, appeared
forthright when he said that all separatist Naga militias “have been ‘taxing’
the people for long with the tacit connivance of the Centre” and that every
militia outfit “mimics a sovereign government…”
What more? Ravi wrote that “the
Centre, at the behest of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, totally
sidelined the state government while inking deals with them in 1997”.
Isn’t the Centre repeating the same
mistakes in 2015?
It is here that Sonia crying foul
makes sense even as a section in the BJP feels that she is worried that the
NSCN-IM is not under the influence of Christian missionaries active in the
region, and hence “may get closer to the nationalist agenda” (of the BJP).
Yet, the picture at the moment is
quite hazy. What appears as of now is that it is only a framework agreement
that has been signed and the real accord might take some time. So, wait for the
details.
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http://www.elections.in/blog/naga-peace-accord/#sthash.aedyW32a.dpuf
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