Indian Army’s Operation in Myanmar and Its Political Impact
June 13, 2015
(Published in elections .in - http://www.elections.in/blog/indian-armys-operation-myanmar-political-impact/)
In a covert operation, the Para Commandos (special forces) of Indian Army along with Assam Rifles crossed into neighbouring Myanmar and attacked two militant camps early on 9 June. Media reports suggest that 83 rebels of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang ((NSCN-K) and allied insurgent groups were killed in the army raid in Myanmar.
Soon after, the operation was hailed as a “bold strategy to eliminate any terrorist threats”. Indian Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar had his own interpretation of the action – “ A simple action against insurgents has changed the mindset of the security scenario of the country”.
India’s Military Operations in Myanmar
No doubt about it. However, to begin with, let there be no ambiguity on certain points with respect to the Indian army’s adventure in Myanmar:
a) Unlike Pakistan or China, Myanmar has a treaty with India from the 1990s on operations across the border.
b) The surgical strikes on insurgent camps operating in the North Eastern Indian states of Nagaland and Manipur, deep in Myanmar early on 9 June were not an attack on the sovereignty of the neighbouring country but retaliation against a series of attacks by the (NSCN-K) and allied insurgents on Indian Army personnel.
c) The ambush on the 6th Battalion of the Dogra Regiment at Chandel (Manipur), close to the Myanmar border, which left 18 soldiers dead on 4 June, at best could only be described as the immediate provocation for the Indian Army.
The army acknowledges this and Major General Ranbir Singh, additional director general of military operations made it clear while talking to the media: “In view of the imminent threat, an immediate response was necessary”.
Reports quoting Indian army officials reiterate that the attack on these insurgents’ camps in Myanmar was selected “for reasons of tactical viability, rather than specific retaliatory intent”.
India’s Record of Conducting Cross-border Military Operations
Of course, carrying out cross-border operations is not a common practice for India. Yet, the Myanmar incident is not without precedent. Consider them:
a) In April-May 1995, India and Myanmar had conducted a joint military operation – “Operation Golden Bird” – along the Mizoram border following the signing of the MoU for maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas. During the operation, they had intercepted and killed 38 insurgents who were moving through the Myanmar-Mizoram border towards Manipur with a consignment of weapons. The operation, however, was disrupted after Myanmar’s military rulers pulled out of the joint operation to protest India giving the Nehru Peace Prize to the Myanmar’s Opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.
b) In 2003, the Indian Army had launched an operation “All Clear” in Bhutan to “help” the Bhutanese Royal Army in flushing out 38 militant camps. It had then targeted the bases of Indian separatist groups operating out of Bhutan.
c) In January 2006 too, India and Myanmar had conducted joint military operations inside Myanmar to flush out militants from the NSCN-K group.
Conflicting Reports on Operation Territory
What makes the present Indian incursion different from the earlier ones is the conflicting reports on the very use of the Myanmar’s soil in this operation. In a Facebook post of 10 May, the director of Myanmar’s presidential office, Zaw Htay, claimed, “According to the information sent by Tatmadaw (Myanmar army) battalions on the ground, we have learned that the military operation was performed on the Indian side at India-Myanmar border”.
Yet, on the very same day, The Wall Street Journal quoted the same official as saying that there was “coordination and cooperation” between the Indian troops and Myanmar’s armed forces based on the area of the raids. He further said, “We will never allow or support insurgents, whether [they are] against Myanmar or against our neighbouring countries”.
Yet another media report suggested that the Indian army had actually sent a communique to their Myanmarese counterparts only minutes before embarking on the operation, and that the Indian ambassador met a minister from Myanmar only after the government offices opened at around 9 am in the morning when the operation was well underway.
Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, the Indian minister of state for Information, claimed that though Myanmar’s military didn’t directly participate in the operation, the two sides were in close touch.
No doubt that information from conflict zones is always contested. There is not a single picture emerged yet from the 2003 Bhutan operations. In this case, too, they are likely to remain so. The Indian Army has clarified that it has not made any photograph of the present operation public. Besides, Myanmar also faces elections soon and the issue is of quite sensitive nature that could be easily exploited during polls.
War of Words Between India and Pakistan
However, back home in India, chest-thumping by some ministers was perhaps avoidable. Consider Rathore’s statement: “I think this message is now very clear to all those who harbour intentions of terror on our country. If there are groups within a country that harbour terror intentions, we will choose a time and place of hitting them”.
His statement invited sharp criticism from leaders in Pakistan, which shelters the Kashmiri militants. “”Pakistan is not like Myanmar,” retorted Pakistan’s Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan. Soon, it snowballed into a full-fledged war of words between the two nations with Defence Minister Parrikar joining the fray, stating “Those who fear India’s new posture have started reacting”.
But aren’t such statements uncalled for?
The Congress is quick to seize the opportunity to state, “There should be sobriety and maturity. Jingoism and boastful claims are not going to help the operations of India’s special forces”.
Reports suggest that a section within the government, too, is of the similar view. After all, the political impact of this military action is unmistakable as it does reinforce Narendra Modi’s image as a tough and uncompromising prime minister in his domestic constituency.
What needs to be ensured is that now when India has finally secured Myanmar’s nod for operations, the Indian army should go all out exercising the military option. This is important to restore peace and normalcy in the country’s insurgency-hit northeastern states. Consider that in 1995, the trapped militants in Myanmar had escaped as a result of the withdrawal of Myanmar from the joint operation. In 2003, too, even in Bhutan, most top leaders had escaped to Bangladesh before the raids. Even before the latest army operation in Myanmar, as a report in Indian Express suggests, Niki Sumi, the self-styled Lieutenant General of the NSCN-K is believed to have succeeded in fleeing the camp in Ponya in Myanmar along with 40 members of the group.
Hence, rather than chest-thumping, it is important that the Indian leadership concentrates on choking the escape routes of these militants – for the peace of the region
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